Another historical record of the
events leading up to WW2 It is a little heavy to read .. But nevertheless
explains so well European events Which resulted in this major
conflict. WORLD WAR II, the name commonly
given to the global conflict of 1939-1945. It was the greatest and most
destructive war in history. Whereas military operations in World War I were
conducted primarily on the European continent, World War II included gigantic
struggles not only in Europe but in Asia, Africa, and the far-flung islands of
the Pacific as well. More than 17 million members of the armed forces of the
various belligerents perished during the conflict. Its conduct strained the
economic capabilities of the major nations and left many countries on the edge
of collapse. Between World Wars After World War I representatives of the
victorious powers met in Paris to devise a peace settlement that would protect
future generations from another such conflict. All agreed that a new framework
or system was needed in international relations. Each power, however, had
different views as to what that framework should be. From their compromises
emerged treaties of peace, the chief of which was that with defeated Germany
signed at Versailles on June 28, 1919. Based on the assumption that Germany and
her allies had been the disturbers of the status quo, these treaties attempted
to place curbs on their future actions. Articles 160, 180, 181, and 198 of the
Treaty of Versailles, for example, forbade Germany to have an army of more than
100,000 men, a fleet of more than 36 combatant vessels, or any submarines or
military or naval aircraft, or to maintain fortifications or military
installations within 50 kilometers of the east bank of the Rhine. In addition,
the defeated states were to be required to pay large sums as reparations for
damages that the victors had suffered during the war.
But these punitive clauses were not supposed
to form the keystone of the new system. That was to be the League of Nations,
the organization whose Covenant was incorporated in the Treaty of Versailles and
in the treaties of St.-Germain-en-Laye with Austria, of Neuilly with Bulgaria,
of Trianon with Hungary, and of Sevres with Turkey (superseded by the Treaty of
Lausanne). With the victorious nations as the original members of the League and
with provision for the admission of other states, including eventually even the
Germans and those who had been on their side, its Assembly was expected to
provide a forum for the airing of all international issues. In the event of any
aggression by one state against another or any breach of one of the peace
treaties, its Council was to mobilize all members, large and small, for a
collective effort to keep the peace.
Neither the punitive clauses of the treaties
nor the Covenant worked out quite as their authors had hoped. Although the
Germans complied with most of the restrictions imposed on them, they recovered
rapidly in relative strength. At Rapallo on April 16, 1922, they signed with the
other outcast of Europe, the Bolshevik USSR, a treaty providing for mutual
renunciation of claims and future economic cooperation. The victors meanwhile
fell out. The British and French disagreed about Middle Eastern issues and about
the amount of reparations that should be exacted from Germany. So sharp did
their exchanges become that by 1923 it was commonly assumed that if there were
another war it might well be one between Britain and France. As for the United
States, its Senate declined to ratify the Treaty of Versailles; it took no part
in the League and withdrew into self-imposed isolation, denying that it bore any
responsibility for the maintenance of peace in Europe.
By the latter part of the 1920's, the
guarantees of peace were somewhat different from those that had been envisioned
in 1919. The articles of the Treaty of Versailles designed to keep Germany in
check were supplemented by defensive alliances between France and certain of
Germany's eastern neighbors: Poland (Feb. 19, 1921) and the nations of the
Little Entente, Czechoslovakia (Jan. 25, 1924), Romania (June 10, 1926), and
Yugoslavia (Nov. 11, 1927). At a conference held in Locarno on Oct. 5-16, 1925,
the German government entered into treaties (signed in London on December 1)
with France, Britain, Belgium, and Italy, guaranteeing the existing
Franco-Belgian-German frontiers. On Sept. 8, 1926, Germany was admitted to the
League. The peace thus rested on three sets of undertakings: the pledges of
mutual support between France and her allies, the guarantees exchanged at
Locarno, and the promises of collective action made by those nations that
subscribed to the Covenant. Events of 1931 and later years were to prove all
these safeguards frail.
BREAKDOWN OF THE VERSAILLES SYSTEM
Manchurian Incident
On Sept. 18, 1931, a small bomb exploded
underneath a section of track on the South Manchuria Railroad. The Japanese
Army, which under long-standing agreements policed the railroad, used this
incident as a pretext for launching operations aimed at conquering all of
Manchuria for Japan. The Chinese government, which had nominal sovereignty over
the area, protested to the League of Nations. Some supporters of the principle
of collective security saw an opportunity for the League to prove that it was
capable of stopping an aggressor. The majority of member governments, however,
did not, feeling that the fate of Manchuria was not of vital concern to them, or
that the Japanese had some justice on their side, or that action by the League
might harm moderates in Tokyo who were trying to hold the army in check. In the
upshot the Council passed two resolutions, one on September 30 and the other on
October 23, Paying little attention to the League's
advice, the Japanese continued their operations. When the Chinese organized a
boycott of Japanese goods, they went even further. Reinforcing the garrison
which they already maintained at Shanghai, in January 1932 they seized control
of that city. By May they had been persuaded by League mediators to reach a
truce agreement with the Chinese in Shanghai, from which their forces were
gradually withdrawn. In the meantime, however, they had convened in Manchuria a
rump assembly and had it proclaim the independence of the region, now to be
called Manchukuo, on February 18. The new state, which came into existence
officially on March 1, signed with Japan on September 15 a treaty making it a
virtual ward of that country. The first Western nation to show umbrage over
these events was the United States. Despite its isolationism it had a long
tradition of interest in the Far East. When the League Council convened to hear
the Chinese protests, the American government sent an official observer to
Geneva. The view in Washington at that time was that Western powers ought not to
do anything that might aggravate the political situation in Tokyo, but Secretary
of State Henry L. Stimson subsequently became convinced that there ought to be
some general assertion of opposition to Japanese aggression. Although himself in
favor of threatening Japan with collective sanctions, he had to reckon with the
stubborn pacifism of President Herbert Hoover. The most that he could do was, on
Jan. 7, 1932, to dispatch a formal note to Tokyo, declaring that the United
States would not recognize Japanese sovereignty over territory acquired by
force. This formulation was termed variously the Stimson Doctrine and the Hoover
Doctrine. Although one of the arguments used by opponents of League action had
been the fact that the United States was not a member of the organization, the
American initiative attracted little immediate support. When asked by Stimson to
make a similar declaration, the British government declined. Not until after the
evacuation of Shanghai did British statesmen even suggest that the League might
adopt the Stimson Doctrine as its own.
The sessions of the League Assembly in the
fall and winter of 1932-1933 were devoted largely to the Manchurian issue. The
commission of inquiry, headed by the 2d earl of Lytton, made its report, stating
that while the Japanese had possessed some grievances their action had been
excessive, that the establishment of an independent Manchukuo had not been in
accordance with the wishes of the people, and that Japanese forces ought to
return the rail lines, restore the status quo ante bellum, and negotiate
a new understanding about Manchuria with the Chinese. After prolonged debate the
Assembly adopted on Feb. 24, 1933, a resolution refusing to recognize Manchukuo
and calling on the Japanese to retire. The only result was to bring on March 27
the resignation (effective in two years' time) of Japan from the League of
Nations. The system of collective security created by the Paris peace treaties
had been tested and been found wanting.
Economic Issues
In the meantime, a severe economic depression
had developed. A crash of the New York stock market in October 1929 had been
followed by a rapid decline in American production, employment, and foreign
commerce. The repercussions were soon felt in all countries that traded with the
United States and also in those where American funds were invested. So far flung
was the network of American commercial and financial relationships that by 1931
people were speaking of a world depression.
It had soon become clear that most European
governments would be unable to continue making payments on World War I debts.
Ever since the early 1920's, British statesmen had been urging that the United
States forgive all or part of what was owed by her wartime allies, proposing
that they in turn remit some or all of the payments due them from Germany as
reparations. The American government had rejected this proposal, but in 1931,
faced with the depression, President Hoover relented and arranged for a one-year
moratorium on both debt and reparation payments. Seeking reelection in 1932, he
dared not repeat the experiment. Some of the debtor states were forced to
default. In the end all but Finland did so, and the result was not only to
embarrass the governments involved but also to strengthen isolationist feeling
in the United States.
Eventually almost all the affected
states sought solutions for their economic problems in independent,
nationalistic action. Seeking a commercial and financial advantage over other
countries, the British abandoned the gold standard and devalued the pound in
1931. Through agreements reached in a conference held at Ottawa on July 21-Aug.
21, 1932, they also abandoned the tradition of free trade and established
preferential tariffs for the Commonwealth. The American government deserted the
gold standard in 1933 and in the same year caused the failure of the London
Monetary and Economic Conference by declaring that it would not join in an
agreement to stabilize exchange rates. Fascist Italy adopted more drastic
measures, instituting rigid economic controls and creating jobs by enlarging the
armed forces and accelerating weapons production. Germany, which was ruled after
Jan. 30, 1933, by the National Socialist (Nazi) dictator Adolf HITLER
, went even farther in the
same directions. The community of nations envisioned in the Paris peace treaties
dissolved into an anarchy of jealous states seeking national advantage and
national self-sufficiency.
Rise of Hitler
By far the most ominous event of these
depression years was the emergence of Hitler in Germany. A psychopathic
personality, he rejected all conventional moral standards. In his book Mein
Kampf (2 vols., 1925-1927) and in later speeches he had disclosed his abhorrence
of such concepts as equality and majority rule, his hatred of Jews, his belief
that "Aryans were a "master race entitled to dominate others, and his
conviction that the state had a right to use any means to achieve its ends. He
had also set forth his views on foreign policy. He held that Germany should
expand in order to bring within it all Europeans of German nationality. Saying
also that the German people needed Lebensraum (space for living), he
indicated that it was to be found in eastern Europe. At the same time he
declared that Germany had to have " a final active reckoning with France.
His words showed that he desired German hegemony over Europe and would have no
scruples about the methods he used.
The other nations of Europe viewed him with
alarm but also with uncertainty. Few could believe that he really meant what he
said, or that once in office he would not become more restrained, more
conventional, and more prudent. At first his actions justified this opinion.
While he carried out the domestic programs he had advocated, succeeding soon in
abolishing all but the forms of democracy and constituting himself fuhrer
(leader) of the German people, externally he followed courses somewhat at odds
with what he had said and written. In token of peaceful intentions he even
negotiated with Poland an agreement relating to the large German minority in
that country. In a joint declaration issued on Jan. 26, 1934, the German and
Polish governments promised for a period of 10 years not to resort to war to
solve differences and not to intervene in behalf of members of their nationality
groups who were not legally citizens of their states.
Until the summer of 1934 the only
actions of Hitler that excited international apprehension were those concerning
armaments. As part of the campaign to revive the German economy, he undertook to
increase production by heavy industry, particularly those branches that would
make the greatest contributions to a war effort. In May 1933, he asked the other
League powers to allow Germany to move immediately toward the "equality
which had been promised her for the distant future. The French refused, pointing
out that the promise had always been conditioned on the development of effective
international controls. Hitler replied by declaring on October 14 that Germany
would proceed to arm herself with or without consent. He announced on the same
day his nation's withdrawal (effective in two years' time) from the League of
Nations. But the effect of these actions was softened by an offer to France of a
bilateral pact in which Germany would agree to limit its army to 300,000 men and
its air force to 50 percent of that of France and to accept some measure of
international control. Although the French refused this offer, taking the
position that they should not sanction German rearmament even in principle, the
fact that the offer had been made left it unclear whether or not Hitler was bent
on carrying out the external programs outlined in Mein Kampf.
The first strong indication that this
might be the case came in July 1934 in Austria. That country had a National
Socialist Party modeled on Hitler's and more or less openly supported by German
officials. In the spring of 1934, the party increased its agitation. Then, when
Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss was assassinated on July 25, it attempted a coup
d'etat. German official statements and troop movements made it seem that the
coup would have active support from across the frontier. The Austrian Nazis had,
however, overestimated their strength. Dollfuss' successor, Dr. Kurt von
Schuschnigg, quickly consolidated his power. Italian dictator Benito Mussolini meanwhile declared that
Italy would not tolerate a change in the status of Austria and moved Italian
troops to the Brenner Pass. Whatever plans the Germans had were frustrated by
these actions.
Stresa Front
The French became increasingly apprehensive as
evidence accumulated to indicate that Hitler planned much more formidable forces
than those of which he had spoken in October and November 1933. On March 10,
1935, one of his officials disclosed that the projected German Air Force would
be larger than the French. Six days later, Hitler himself proclaimed the
reinstitution of compulsory military service.
To cope with the prospective peril, the French
had begun to mature a strategy. Foreign Minister Louis Barthou summarized it as
an effort " to group the European interests that could be menaced by the rapid
revival of Germany. Although Barthou was assassinated at Marseille on Oct.
9, 1934, in company with King Alexander I of Yugoslavia, his policy was carried
on (albeit somewhat irresolutely) by his successor, Pierre Laval. To begin with,
in January 1935, Laval held formal conversations with Mussolini, seeking a
common Franco-Italian front. These conversations were welcomed by the Italian
dictator. Soon after the emergence of Hitler he had proposed that Italy, France,
Great Britain, and Germany agree to procedures by which they alone, bypassing
the League of Nations, might revise the Treaty of Versailles. The French and
British had declined, and the resultant Four-Power Pact initialed at Rome on
June 7, 1933 (signed on July 15), provided for nothing more than consultation on
matters of mutual interest. Now the growth of French apprehension about Hitler
gave Italy more leverage.
Mussolini's principal aim was to circumvent
the provisions of the League Covenant that might give protection to Ethiopia,
for he had been trying unsuccessfully since the early 1920's to make that nation
an economic colony of Italy, and at some point before 1933 he had decided to
attempt its forcible conquest. He feared that, since Ethiopia had been admitted
to the League in 1923, it might be able to win that body's support, but he
recognized that if the British and French did not join in collective resolutions
and sanctions, these would be ineffectual. A clash between Italian and Ethiopian
troops at the watering hole of Wal Wal on Dec. 5, 1934, had just given him a
potential casus belli. To Ethiopia's appeal for League arbitration he had
rejoined that he would settle the incident exclusively in Italy's interest. Now
the trip of Laval to Rome, seeking Italian support against Hitler, gave him the
opportunity to bargain for the acquiescence of France and perhaps, through
France, of Britain.
The formal convention signed by Laval and
Mussolini on Jan. 7, 1935, said nothing about Ethiopia: it merely resolved
certain issues with regard to French and Italian colonies already existing in
Africa. Mussolini declared later, however, that Laval had given him verbal
assurance of a free hand in Ethiopia, and Laval himself admitted that he had
promised not to interfere with Italian economic penetration there. The Frenchman
professed not to have made any commitment with regard to political or military
penetration, but what was said and left unsaid gave Mussolini warrant for
interpreting the conversations as he did, and he accelerated preparations for
war, apparently much less concerned now about interference by the League.
Laval had gotten what he had sought. Another
convention, signed on the same day, affirmed that France and Italy would jointly
keep watch on events in Austria and confer about common action if that nation
were imperiled, and it was agreed that Mussolini should invite the British to a
meeting at Stresa, with the object of adding them to the anti-German front. This
conference, held on April 11-14, 1935, was a partial success. All three
governments joined in a commitment to oppose, " by all practicable means, any
unilateral repudiation of treaties which may endanger the peace of Europe.
While this commitment was qualified by a provision requiring the use of League
machinery, it seemed a direct warning to Hitler. The Stresa declaration was
followed, moreover, by action to open a League debate on the question of whether
or not Germany's reinstitution of compulsory military service constituted a
unilateral breach of the Treaty of Versailles. On April 17, the Council, with
only one abstention (that of Denmark) voted in principle its condemnation of all
unilateral violations of treaties and referred the German case to the Assembly.
Meanwhile, Laval began negotiations with the
ambassador of the USSR in Paris. On May 2, they announced the signature of a
five-year pact pledging mutual assistance in the event that either nation was
the victim of aggression. This was followed on May 16 by a similar pact between
the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. Coupled with the earlier treaties that
allied Poland and the Little Entente with France, these accords seemed to close
the ring around Nazi Germany, and they were accompanied by movements within all
the major European governments to increase spending on armaments. In June 1935,
the French ambassador in Berlin, Andre Francois-Poncet, reported the German
leaders to be more "defeated and discouraged than he had ever seen them.
Anglo-German Naval Agreement
The so-called Stresa front was short lived.
Some members of the British government reacted to the evidence of German
rearmament by drawing the moral that the nation should detach itself and avoid
such enforced involvement in war as that of 1914. Finding the German government
full of protestations of goodwill for Britain, members of this group reasoned
that the course of prudence was to eliminate all potential Anglo-German issues.
One that had embittered relations between the two countries in pre-World War I
years had been naval rivalry, and when the Admiralty reported exchanges with the
Germans that revealed the possibility of a bilateral compact on the relative
size of the two fleets, considerable official sentiment developed in favor of
following it up. This was done, though in the most closely guarded secrecy, and
on June 18, 1935, a naval pact with Germany was signed. It provided that Germany
could build a fleet of capital ships equal in tonnage to one third, and a fleet
of submarines equal to 60 percent, of that of the Royal Navy. In view of the
fact that the Treaty of Versailles had set other limits on German naval strength
and had forbidden the construction of submarines, these terms constituted
acceptance by Britain of Germany's repudiation of those articles. Coming barely
two months after the Stresa accords, this pact gave evidence that the nations
apparently joined against Germany were in fact far from united.
Nor did the Franco-Soviet accord prove more
durable. Laval had always doubted the wisdom of the Barthou policy and inclined
toward the view that France might be better off in league with Germany than
against her. On Jan. 13, 1935, the plebiscite promised by the Treaty of
Versailles had taken place in the Saar, with more than 90 percent of the voters
opting for reunion with Germany, and Laval not only accepted the verdict with
good cheer but made the point to diplomats that France would not necessarily be
intransigent in all matters that affected Germany. Instead of seeking prompt
ratification of the Franco-Soviet Pact by the French Parliament, he held it over
(it was carried through that body by his successor, Albert Sarraut, in February
1936), meanwhile evading all suggestions from the Soviet capital of a military
convention to supplement it and to make clear how it might be carried out. The
Soviets were pressing Laval onto delicate ground, it is true, for a military
convention would involve such issues as whether or not Soviet troops could move
across Poland or Romania, and Laval, who had become premier on June 7, 1935, was
looking forward uneasily to a national election and to the possibility that the
opposition Popular Front, of which the Communists were part, might profit from a
closer Franco-Soviet tie. Nevertheless, his hesitancies provided further
evidence that the unity of Europe against Germany might be an illusion.
Italo-Ethiopian War
Although the British at Stresa had given
Mussolini no assurances that they would acquiesce in his conquest of Ethiopia,
their reticences had been so interpreted by him, and he was strengthened in this
view when, in June 1935, Anthony Eden, minister for League of Nations affairs,
came to Rome to suggest that Britain might cede to Ethiopia part of British
Somaliland so that Ethiopia might in turn appease Italy by ceding to it some
land adjacent to Italian Somaliland. Eden even suggested that a way might be
found to make Ethiopia a virtual economic protectorate of Italy. Mussolini soon
learned that these gestures did not necessarily mean what he thought. When he
rejected Eden's proposals and continued preparations for war, the British
government moved warships into the Mediterranean Sea as if in preparation for a
League vote of sanctions against Italy. On September 11, after Foreign Secretary
Sir Samuel Hoare addressed the League Assembly and declared firmly that Britain
would be "second to none in fulfilling her obligations under the Covenant,
Mussolini was faced with the very contingency that he thought his diplomacy had
prevented: the possibility of League intervention in behalf of Ethiopia. He
nevertheless moved forward. When Emperor Haile Selassie ordered Ethiopian
mobilization on September 29, he responded by proclaiming national mobilization
in Italy. On October 3, his armies attacked from Eritrea and thus opened war.
In Geneva the League Council, immediately
heard the protests of Haile Selassie's representative. On October 7, with Italy
alone abstaining, it voted to condemn Mussolini's aggression as a resort to war
in defiance of Article 12 of the Covenant. Referred to the Assembly, this
resolution on October 11 won the support of 50 of the 54 members, only Italy and
her client states, Albania, Austria, and Hungary, opposing it. It remained for a
Coordination Committee of the League to determine what sanctions should be
imposed. Here practical rather than moral issues arose, for, as a totalitarian
state that had endeavored for more than a decade to achieve national
self-sufficiency, Fearing that closure of the canal would
lead to war with Italy, the British government, which controlled the waterway,
had little inclination to take that step. As for oil, it was doubtful whether a
League decree could be effective in view of the fact that the leading producer,
the United States, was not bound by the Covenant. Although Congress had enacted
a so-called Neutrality Act (signed on Aug. 31, 1935), which required embargoes
to be laid on exports of munitions to nations at war, it did not apply to
petroleum products. While President Franklin D. ROOSEVELT
declared on November 15
that oil and other commodities were "essential war materials and ought to
be included, there was no assurance that American exporters would adopt such a
"moral embargo, or that if they did not, Congress would amend the law to
cover these items. The American government encouraged the League powers to
expect cooperation but could not guarantee it.
When the Coordination Committee brought in its
report on October 19, it made only five relatively mild recommendations for
sanctions against Italy: embargoes on shipments of arms to her; bans on loans
and credits; bans on imports from her; embargoes on exports to her of transport
animals, rubber, and a variety of metals; and joint aid to nations that suffered
economically as a result of taking these steps. Voted on separately in the
Assembly, they were approved by majorities respectively of 50, 49, 48, 48, and
39. Since their practical effect would be slight, the chief hope was that the
display of unity in world opinion would impress Mussolini and cause him to
change his course. It did not.
Hoare-Laval Plan
As Italian military operations continued,
sentiment grew, especially in Britain, for more effective action. Between
January and June 1935, a so-called Peace Ballot, a national referendum supported
by the British League of Nations Union and allied groups, had yielded 6,784,368
votes endorsing the principle that, if one nation insisted on attacking another,
the other nations should combine to employ not only economic but also military
sanctions (10,027,608 favored economic sanctions alone). Although this total
encompassed a substantial percentage of the electorate, the result had been
discounted by most politicians on the ground that the ballot had probably not
been understood fully by its signers. Now, however, they began to consider that
it had been more significant. Campaigning in a general election, spokesmen for
the government felt obliged to use increasingly vigorous words in speaking of
what Britain and the League would do. Returned on November 14 with an
overwhelming majority of seats in the House of Commons (431 to 184), the
Conservative cabinet was under pressure to live up to its promises.
Those ministers who were dubious about the
whole policy of sanctions found this pressure especially onerous. They urged a
further effort to induce Mussolini to abandon the war and thus, they hoped, to
rescue Britain from the predicament in which she was likely soon to find
herself. Precisely what was said and agreed on within the cabinet remains
unknown. The result was, however, that Hoare set off in early December for a
skating holiday in Switzerland, and that he paused for two days (December 7-8)
in Paris for intensive conversations with Laval. The result of these
conversations was an agreement on proposals to be made secretly to Mussolini. He
was to be asked to halt the war with the understanding that Italy would receive
from Ethiopia the northeastern section of the Tigre, part of the desert of
Danakil, all of the Ogaden region, and "exclusive economic rights in the
country south of 8 degrees north latitude and east of 35 degrees east longitude.
All that Italy would yield in return would be a corridor giving Ethiopia a camel
track to the sea across almost impassable desert. This plan offered Italy almost
everything that she could hope to obtain by continuing her campaign.
Convinced that the application of further
sanctions would lead to a general war harmful to French interests, Laval had
devised these terms. He had also developed the strategy to be followed. The plan
was to be put before Mussolini first. After he accepted, it was to be shown to
Haile Selassie. When the Ethiopian ruler rejected it, the French and British
would be able to say that he had refused peace, and could not only oppose the
imposition of further sanctions but also call for the lifting of those that had
already been voted. Whatever the outcome for Ethiopia, the crisis between the
League powers and Italy would have been bridged, and some facsimile of the
Stresa front might be put together again. Even before they could be put into
diplomatic cables, however, the terms of the plan leaked to the press. From
partisans of Ethiopia and the League there arose an instant and loud outcry. The
British and French governments were accused of preparing to betray the interests
of a small nation, to sacrifice the principle of collective security, and reward
an aggressor. So strong was feeling in Britain that Prime Minister Stanley
Baldwin felt compelled on December 18 to request Hoare's resignation and soon
afterward to appoint as his successor Eden, the champion of the League. In
France, Laval's government barely survived a vote of confidence in the Chamber
of Deputies on December 29. From the United States, where sentiment for
effective embargoes had been rapidly growing, came a torrent of criticism of
British and French shortsightedness.
Mussolini had meanwhile given indication that
he would not in any case accept less than the total conquest of Ethiopia. In
January 1936, there was discussion within the League of adding an oil embargo to
the sanctions. Despite the events that had followed the release of the
Hoare-Laval terms, however, official French and British opinion was still
opposed to such action. The decision was for delay, pending the outcome of
Roosevelt's efforts to amend the American neutrality laws. Since nothing
encouraging was done by Congress, nothing at all was done by the League. As it
turned out, the limit of its capacities had been reached in the vote of
sanctions of October. As winter turned into spring, the Italian offensive in
Ethiopia gained momentum. On May 5, 1936, Fascist troops marched into the
capital, Addis Ababa. Four days later, Mussolini proclaimed the war ended and
Ethiopia part of Italian East Africa. By summer most of the League powers had
concluded that they could only accept as a fact the extinction of Ethiopian
sovereignty, and the Assembly agreed that sanctions against Italy should be
suspended as of July 15. The League's machinery for maintaining collective
security had proved ineffectual.
Rhineland Coup
An even more significant demonstration of this
fact came before the Italo-Ethiopian War was liquidated. Seeing the split within
the Stresa front, Hitler decided to act in the Rhineland--to repudiate the
articles of the Treaty of Versailles that declared that region permanently
demilitarized. When he communicated this decision to his generals, they were
appalled. In their view the German Army was still comparatively weak, and the
air force had relatively little offensive capability. They warned the fuhrer
that the French had the power single-handedly to drive a German force from the
region and impose humiliating terms. Hitler's response was a simple assertion
that the French would not move. He ordered the requisite preparations made.
The legal pretext he found in the
Franco-Soviet Pact of 1935. By committing France to act against Germany in the
event of German aggression against the USSR, Hitler could argue, this pact
constituted a repudiation of the Locarno treaties, in which France had promised
never to make war on Germany except in obedience to resolutions by the League of
Nations. It also constituted a threat to Germany, he could say, and therefore,
despite the Treaty of Versailles, gave warrant for action in self-defense. On
March 7, 1936, shortly after the French Assembly's ratification of the
Franco-Soviet Pact, he exposed this reasoning in diplomatic notes and in a
speech to the Reichstag. He announced that German troops were moving into the
demilitarized zone. At the same time, he offered as measures of reassurance to
sign nonaggression pacts with France and all Germany's neighbors, east as well
as west; to concert with the French a new demilitarization agreement, applying
to both sides of the frontier; and to reenter the League of Nations.
The French government was shocked. Premier
Sarraut responded with a forceful radio address, declaring, "We shall not leave
Strasbourg under the German cannon. As he later testified, however, he and
his colleagues were uncertain as to what they would in fact do. Reports by
military men on France's capacity to repel the German force were generally
pessimistic. The army, they said, was inadequate. It would be necessary to call
up reservists in order to fill its ranks. Overestimating the German bomber
force, they warned that Paris and other centers lacked the air defenses to
prevent devastating raids. Their judgments thus reinforced the feeling that had
been instinctive among the principal members of the cabinet--that France dare
not act alone, and that perhaps she should not act even if she received support
from abroad.
One capital with which they were particularly
concerned was Warsaw. On the day of Hitler's announcement the Polish government
gave them reassurance that in the event of a clash it would stand by the
alliance of 1921 and proposed immediate conversations. Two days later, on March
9, however, it declared that it accepted the German thesis and regarded the
reoccupation of the Rhineland as a legitimate response to the Franco-Soviet
Pact. Their objective may have been merely to emphasize that Polish support of
France would constitute action above and beyond the 1921 treaty, but the
impression given the French government was that the Poles were playing a double
game, and that France could not rely on them. The other nation whose support
would be crucial to the French in a clash with Germany was Great Britain, and
while the British government was more forthright than the Polish, it gave France
even less encouragement to stand fast. Eden declared the German action to be
inexcusable but not threatening, especially in view of Hitler's offer of
nonaggression pacts. Calling for a meeting of the League Council, he said that
no decision should be taken beforehand by any government. The only promise he
made was that Britain would support France if she were attacked by Germany in
the period before the League acted.
The French government was thus informed by its
two most important allies that it could not expect backing if it replied to the
Germans with force. Some members of the Sarraut cabinet found this news not
unwelcome. Perhaps most did, for they faced a general election in May; they felt
that a call-up of reservists would cost them votes; and, in view of the
identification of their Popular Front opponents with antifascism, they feared
that any crisis with Germany might have the same effect. The French press, also
preoccupied with domestic affairs, raised little clamor for action.
Consequently, on March 11, Sarraut backed away from his earlier position,
announcing that the cabinet had decided to seek a solution within the framework
of the League of Nations, working in conjunction with the othr signers of the
Locarno Pact. The League did in fact discuss a resolution condemning the German
action. Nothing came of this discussion, however, and the Rhineland question was
lost to sight in the pell-mell rush of other events. Hitler's coup had
succeeded. Not only the machinery of the League but also the French system of
alliances lay in ruins. There were no longer any collective guarantees of the
peace, and the end of the truce of 1918-1919 was in sight.
END OF THE LONG ARMISTICE
Spanish Civil War
Hardly were the Ethiopian and Rhineland crises
out of mind when a new storm swept the stage. In Spanish Morocco on July 17,
1936, so-called Nationalists launched a revolution against the Popular Front
government of the five-year old Spanish Republic (garrisons in Spain proper rose
the next day). Championing ideas much like those of the Fascists and Nazis, they
applied immediately to Rome and Berlin for aid. The republicans or Loyalists (as
they became known) with equal alacrity applied for help to Paris, where the May
elections had given victory to the Popular Front and made Leon Blum, a
Socialist, premier in June. From the outset the Spanish Civil War was a European
problem.
Italy and Germany both agreed promptly to act.
Italian ships and planes were soon aiding Nationalist troops to cross from
Morocco to the Iberian Peninsula, and before long Italians and Germans were
actually fighting in the Nationalist ranks. On November 28, Mussolini signed
with the Nationalist leader, Gen. Francisco Franco, a pact providing that
Italian aid should be recompensed by economic cooperation, political cooperation
in the western Mediterranean, and "benevolent neutrality on the part of
Spain in a general war. Later, on March 20, 1937, Hitler entered into an
agreement with Franco that promised consultations in the event of a European war
and guaranteed the export to Germany of quantities of Spanish provisions and raw
materials.
At first the French government was disposed to
give aid to the republicans, and, indeed, Premier Blum immediately authorized
sales of aircraft and munitions. But counsels of caution soon came to the fore.
With little of the regular army loyal to it, the Spanish Republic seemed
unlikely to survive. Since the Spanish Popular Front was somewhat more radical
than the French, its cabinet was viewed askance by some members of the Blum
government. Officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs warned furthermore that
assistance to the republicans would probably lead to increased Italian and
German assistance to the Nationalists, and that the eventual outcome might well
be a general European war. This last consideration was pressed on the French by
their British allies. Many in the majority Conservative Party felt that
Britain's position should be "a plague o' both your houses. While most
Liberals and Labourites praised the republic and damned the Nationalists, few
argued that British interests were involved in the civil war. The Baldwin
cabinet therefore had mass support in adopting the position that the aim of the
democracies should be to quarantine Spain and prevent the conflict from
spreading.
Torn within and under pressure from London,
the Blum cabinet decided to take a similar stand. On Aug. 1, 1936, it proclaimed
a policy of nonintervention, declaring that the Spaniards should be allowed to
fight out their war without aid in men or materiel from any other country and
asking all other governments to join in this course. A total of 27 nations,
including Italy and Germany, agreed, and an international Nonintervention
Committee was established in London to keep watch on the fulfillment of these
pledges. In actuality the committee never proved effective. The Italians and
Germans continued more or less openly to assist Franco, and the Soviet
government, despite its promise to the contrary, contributed men and supplies to
the republicans. Even the French wavered from time to time, leaving the Pyrenees
frontier open on two occasions (in November 1937 and April-May 1938) for
shipments to the republic. Among the European powers only Britain was faithful
to the pledge. The United States, though not a party to it, followed the British
by applying its neutrality laws to the civil war. Partly because Soviet and
French aid to the republic was considerably less than Italian and German aid to
the Nationalists, partly because of military advantages on Franco's side, and
partly because of divisions among the Loyalists, the Nationalists eventually
triumphed. By the end of March 1939, Franco was master of nearly all of Spain.
The Spanish conflict was not the match that
touched off a new world war. It did, however, make tensions more acute. Even
among those in Britain, France, and the United States who continued to regard
nonintervention as a wise policy there were some who felt that Spain represented
one more victory for the totalitarian states, and that this fact brought nearer
the moment when their career of success would have to be checked. Among the
Italians and Germans it strengthened the illusion that the democracies were weak
willed and would not resist.
Sino-Japanese War
As the Spanish Civil War rounded out its first
year, a crisis arose in another part of the globe. Ever since they had created
the satellite state of Manchukuo, the Japanese had been discussing further steps
toward national expansion. Moderate factions had advocated the use of peaceful
means, particularly the application of economic pressure to China, coupled with
efforts to induce the Chinese government to accept a client status. These
measures had, however, been only partially successful. Extremist groups had
become increasingly restless, and the government had edged steadily toward a
more forceful policy.
On April 18, 1934, the official spokesman for
the Foreign Office, Eiji Amau, announced that any effort by a Western power to
aid China would be opposed by Japan. In effect, this declaration was a Japanese
Monroe Doctrine for eastern Asia. In December, Japan gave notice that she would
no longer be bound by the Washington Naval (Five-Power) Treaty of 1922, which
had stipulated that Japanese tonnage in capital ships should not exceed
three-fifths that of Britain or the United States. After attempting
unsuccessfully in 1935 to arrange for the secession of the northern provinces of
China and the establishment there of another satellite state, the Japanese
government on Aug. 11, 1936, devised a new statement of "fundamental principles
of a national policy, declaring Japan's destiny to be the dominating force
in all of eastern Asia.
Most of the powers with interests in the
Far East failed to respond with any vigor. The United States contented itself
with mild diplomatic protests, and while the British spoke of extending help to
China, they made no move to do so. Only the Soviet Union acted in such a way as
to indicate that it might at some point resist a Japanese advance. On March 12,
1936, it signed a mutual defense pact with its client state, Outer Mongolia
(Mongolian People's Republic). More important, Soviet dictator Joseph STALIN advised the Chinese
Communists to make peace with the central government and form a common front.
Faced with these gestures by the USSR, the Japanese government seized on a
proposal from the Germans and on November 25 signed with Hitler an
Anti-Comintern Pact. This agreement stipulated nothing more than that the two
governments exchange data about, and collaborate in suppressing, Communist
activities. Inevitably, however, other governments suspected that it contained
secret articles making the two nations allies. The result in both London and
Washington was to quicken apprehension concerning possible Japanese aggressive
moves. In April 1937, the British government began belatedly to supply financial
and technical assistance to China, and American officials talked openly of doing
likewise.
Rising prospects for foreign support of China,
coupled with various domestic developments, led the Japanese government to
decide that it could no longer achieve its objects by peaceful means. On July 7,
1937, taking advantage of a minor clash at the Marco Polo Bridge near Peiping
(Peking), the Japanese Army opened a large-scale invasion of China. The other
powers still did not act. Britain and the United States delivered diplomatic
protests, and on October 6 the League Assembly voted to condemn Japan's action
but not to brand it as aggression and not therefore to invoke sanctions.
Speaking at Chicago on the previous day, Roosevelt had said that an "epidemic of
world lawlessness was spreading and suggested that, as with an epidemic
disease, it might be met by a "quarantine. It soon became clear, however,
that he would not go on to advocate combined action against Japan. Instead a
meeting was called in Brussels of the 18 nations that had adhered to the
Nine-Power Treaty, signed in Washington in 1922 and promising respect for the
sovereignty, independence, and territorial and administrative integrity of
China. From this meeting issued, on November 24, nothing more than an
exhortation to Japan to mend her ways. The Soviet Union for its part was caught
up in a domestic crisis, the result of which was a purge of the leading generals
in the army. In August 1938, its forces did engage in a 10-day skirmish with
Japanese troops that had infringed the Soviet border. Aside from sending a
trickle of aid to the Chinese, however, no power did anything more.
The Japanese were able in 18 months to overrun
the area around Peiping, the central Yangtze Basin, and most of the coast of
southern China. By the end of 1938 they controlled the richest portions of the
country and exercised sway over nearly half its population. In uneasy
cooperation with the Communists the Chinese central government was organizing
itself for prolonged resistance, and, in fact, war was to continue for more than
eight years. Nevertheless, the Japanese aggression seemed at the time to have
been an overwhelming success. And in view of the association of the Japanese
with the Germans (and after Nov. 6, 1937, with the Italians) in the
Anti-Comintern Pact, their triumph seemed another score on the side of the
totalitarian states, another encouragement to them, another warning to the
democracies.
The Axis and the Anschluss
Even before the Sino-Japanese War the French
and British had begun to take some action. Military authorities in both
countries estimated (probably erroneously) that the Germans had a long lead in
preparations for war. To bring themselves abreast the French decided in October
1936 to undertake a four-year rearmament program, and the British followed their
example. The two governments also gave fresh thought to the possibility of
redressing the balance by finding allies. Aware of the isolationism of the
United States, suspicious of Soviet communism, and apprehensive that in any case
the army purges of 1937 might have weakened the USSR, they turned inevitably to
the idea of allying themselves with Italy--of recreating the Stresa front.
Mussolini, however, had been drawing closer to Hitler. After both independently
gave aid to Franco, discussion arose about the possibility of cooperation in
wider spheres. Hitler, who had prophesied a German-Italian entente in Mein
Kampf, made the first overtures. In October 1936, the Italian foreign
minister, Conte Galeazzo Ciano, visited Germany and arrived at vague
understandings on common action against international communism. On November 1,
reacting viscerally to the British decision on rearmament, the duce made a
speech. In it he spoke of a "vertical line between Rome and Berlin that was
"not a partition but rather an axis round which all European states animated by
the will to collaboration and peace can also collaborate. Seizing on his
words, commentators soon coupled Italy and Germany as the Axis powers.
They were not yet formal allies. Indeed, from
the French and British standpoint, it seemed that they were far from being so.
After the settlement of the Ethiopian affair, Italy's paramount interests
appeared once again to lie in the Danubian region. And it was there that Hitler
seemed most likely to make his next move. He had continued to give strong
backing to the Austrian Nazis. In February 1938, through pressure on Chancellor
von Schuschnigg, he forced the appointment of Nazis to key posts in the Austrian
government. He and they talked openly of an Anschluss: a political union. It
remained to be seen whether Mussolini would react again as he had in 1934. The
Italian dictator did in fact sound out the British government on the possibility
of an accord. He did not ask that Britain guarantee support against Germany, but
merely that it recognize his conquest of Ethiopia and reach an entente with him
on Mediterranean issues. This would be enough, he implied, to enable him to
stand up to Hitler on the Austrian question. Whether he was in earnest or not
remains doubtful. In any event, Foreign Secretary Eden took the view that an
understanding with Italy was impossible without the termination of Italian
intervention in Spain. Although the majority of the cabinet disagreed with him
and he resigned, there was so much support for his position in the House of
Commons that the government felt compelled to go slowly.
Meanwhile, Hitler moved. On Nov. 5, 1937, he
had disclosed his thoughts to some of his principal political and military
subordinates. The next six to eight years, he said, would bring Germany to the
peak of her relative power. Thereafter rearmament by other nations, coupled with
the obsolescence of German weapons, would mean that any change would be for the
worse. " Germany's problem could only be solved by means of force, he
declared, and "it was his unalterable resolve to solve Germany's problem of
space at the latest by 1943-1945. The first steps would be the conquest of
Austria and Czechoslovakia. After that the schedule would depend on
circumstances. Morally sure that Italy would not resist, he had made
preparations to act against Austria. His demand for the installation of Nazis in
key posts in that government was a first step. When Schuschnigg made a sign of
defiance, announcing a projected plebiscite in which the Austrian people would
register their desire to remain independent, Hitler sent an angry ultimatum
demanding its cancellation. Encouraged by Schuschnigg's compliance, he then
demanded that a Nazi be installed as chancellor. When rebuffed, he directed Dr.
Arthur Seyss-Inquart, Austrian Nazi minister of the interior, to proclaim
himself head of a provisional government and invite German intervention. This
was done. German troops crossed the border early on March 12. On the following
day, Anschluss was proclaimed, and on March 14 Hitler himself was in Vienna.
Having received no encouraging reply from London, Mussolini had acquiesced,
telling Hitler's envoy that "Austria would be immaterial to him. Since the
British had taken the position even in 1934 that Austria was not a direct
concern of theirs, they contented themselves with a strong diplomatic protest.
The French, embroiled in a domestic crisis and having only a caretaker cabinet,
were incapable of even contemplating action. In the series of successes of the
dictatorships the conquest of Austria was the most rapid, the most complete, and
the most feebly opposed.
Czech Crisis
It was clear to all the world that
Czechoslovakia was now in peril. German garrisons ringed its western frontiers,
and the German press and radio thundered about persecution suffered by the
German minority there. In the Sudetenland, where most of this minority resided,
a constant clamor was maintained by Nazi sympathizers whose leaders plainly took
their orders from Berlin. Reacting to evidence of German troop concentrations,
the Czechs on May 20, 1938, ordered the mobilization of reserves along the
German frontier. Their French ally stood by them, warning the Germans not to
attack. The British ambassador in Berlin added reinforcement by reminding the
German Foreign Office that Britain was an ally of France, and the Soviet
government declared that it would live up to its alliance with Czechoslovakia.
This so-called May crisis proved short lived, for on May 22, Hitler sent to
Prague assurances that he was not concentrating troops and that he had no
aggressive designs.
Although this episode was frequently cited
later as an instance in which firmness by the other powers had forced Hitler to
back down, the fact was that the crisis was illusory. While the fuhrer intended
eventually to move against Czechoslovakia, it had not been in his mind to act so
soon after the Anschluss. On April 21, he had ordered the High Command of the
Armed Forces (OKW) to bring up to date plans for a Czech campaign, but the work
was not completed until mid-May. Hitler was, in fact, giving his approval to
this document on the very day when the Czechs mobilized, and the first words of
his covering letter were, "It is not my intention to smash Czechoslovakia in the
immediate future without provocation, unless an unavoidable development
within Czechoslovakia forces the issue. If the May crisis had any
result, it may have been to anger Hitler and incline him to advance his
timetable. His associates testified later that he was furious at having to give
assurances to the Czechs, and on May 30 he revised his directive to read, "It is
my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the near
future. Perhaps, too, the false sense of having been at the very brink of
war had a palsying effect on the governments that had momentarily seemed so
firm.
In succeeding weeks and months the
British showed an increasing disposition to arrange some appeasement of the
Germans. Neville
CHAMBERLAIN was now prime minister,
having succeeded Baldwin on May 28, 1937, and he was strongly of the view that
the Germans had many legitimate grievances, that it would not be in the interest
of the world for the powers to insist obstinately on maintaining the status quo,
and that every conceivable step should be taken to avert war. His position in
the May crisis had actually been a good deal less firm than it seemed, and he
took pains afterward to make this plain. Through newspaper leaks he let it be
known that Britain saw merit in the German position on the Sudetenland. On Aug.
3, 1938, he dispatched the 1st Viscount Runciman to Czechoslovakia to devise a
formula that might satisfy Hitler. On September 7, in a widely noticed editorial
that was probably inspired by the government, the London Times went so
far as to suggest that the Sudetenland might be allowed to secede and unite
itself with Germany. Hitler had meanwhile fixed October 1 as the date on which
German forces were to move on Czechoslovakia. By early September, increased
agitation by the Sudeten Nazis and the German press and radio gave notice that
some kind of climax was approaching. At a party rally in Nurnberg on September
12, Hitler delivered a tirade against the Czechs. Observers reported infantry
and armored units moving to the frontiers, and this time there was no question
of the fact.
Berchtesgaden and Bad Godesberg
To avert the impending crisis, Chamberlain
resolved to meet face to face with Hitler. Although he was 69 years old and had
never been in an airplane before, he telegraphed the German dictator offering to
fly over at once, and on September 15, Hitler met him at Berchtesgaden. There
the prime The initial response from Prague was negative.
The government of President Eduard Benes was well aware that in sacrificing the
Sudetenland Czechoslovakia would lose not only valuable resources and industrial
plants but also her only natural defenses against Germany, and Benes had thus
far employed every device to prevent its loss. But this initial response was not
the final one. Fearful as they were of the Germans, Czech leaders were even more
frightened of the Russians. Further dispatches from London and Paris impressed
on them the fact that even if the Western democracies went to war in their
behalf, British and French troops would not come to Czechoslovakia. Soviet
troops, on the other hand, might do so. There were persistent hints from Moscow
that they would force their way through Romania or Poland. The general feeling
among Czech leaders was that, if so, they would never withdraw. The cabinet, or
at least some part of it, decided that the course of wisdom was to accept the
sacrifices urged by the British and French. Declaring that he was acting with
the knowledge of Benes, Premier Milan Hodza communicated secretly with Bonnet,
requesting a statement that France would not defend Czechoslovakia if the
Anglo-French proposals were rejected. With this in hand, he indicated, it would
be possible for the cabinet to justify acceptance of them. Bonnet complied, and
on September 21 the Czechs gave notice that they would agree to the terms which
Chamberlain and Hitler had devised at Berchtesgaden.
Delighted, Chamberlain arranged for another
meeting with the fuhrer, this time at Bad Godesberg on the Rhine. When he
arrived on September 22, however, he found to his dismay that the Berchtesgaden
terms no longer satisfied Hitler. The German now demanded not only that the
Sudetenland be ceded to Germany but that it be turned over to her immediately:
before 2 pm on September 28. Since Chamberlain had envisaged a survey of the
area by an international commission and German-Czech negotiations to determine
new boundaries, this meant the ruin of all he had arranged. On September 23, he
left for home, heavyhearted and doubtful that war could be averted.
Munich
For the next few days, Europe seemed on the
verge of war. The Czechs mobilized. Daladier and Bonnet came again to London,
where they were assured more or less definitively of British support. They in
turn promised backing to the Czechs. On September 26, Hitler spoke at the
Sportspalast in Berlin, proclaiming in violent language that the Sudeten issue
would be solved in a matter of days, if necessary by force. On the following
day, the British cabinet ordered partial mobilization. Air-raid shelters began
to go up in London. Chamberlain expressed his attitude in a radio address to the
British people. "How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be
digging trenches and trying on gas-masks here because of a quarrel in a faraway
country between people of whom we know nothing! Grasping at straws, he
wrote again to Hitler and sent a message to Mussolini requesting Italian
influence on behalf of a peaceful settlement. President Roosevelt on September
26 appealed to Hitler to negotiate with the other Europeans.
While the German leader had hoped that France
would not act and had counted on the British not to do so, he told intimates
that he was ready to make war if it proved necessary. His generals were almost
unanimous in holding that Germany was not in fact ready to fight against
Czechoslovakia, France, Britain, and probably the USSR, but Hitler appeared to
have little regard for their opinions. On the morning of September 28, he seemed
prepared to carry out his threat, come what might. Before the 2 pm deadline,
however, he received Chamberlain's new message, a communication from the French
ambassador which indicated that France would go to almost any length to avoid
war, and a message from Mussolini proposing an Anglo-French-German-Italian
conference to compose the issue. Informing the Western governments that he would
postpone his deadline until October 1 (the date fixed by his original plans), he
agreed to accept the duce's suggestions.
The conference met at Munich on September
29-30. A new plan was put forward by Mussolini. Since it had actually been drawn
up in Berlin, Hitler said that he found it a satisfactory basis for negotiation.
Chamberlain and Daladier accepted it with few amendments. The four leaders
affixed their signatures, and Chamberlain returned to London to declare that he
brought back "peace with honour, adding, "I believe it is peace in our
time. The Munich agreement stipulated that the Germans should occupy the
Sudetenland by October 10; that an international commission, representing the
four powers and Czechoslovakia, should arrange the transfer and draw new
boundaries not only there but also on the Czech-Polish and Czech-Hungarian
frontiers; and that afterward all four powers would guarantee these new
frontiers. Dominated by the Germans, the commission awarded to Germany all the
border area that had been shown as German in the Austro-Hungarian census of
1910. This included approximately 10,000 square miles and 3,500,000 persons. The
commission also approved Polish seizure of the Teschen region, which took place
on October 2, and on November 2 awarded to Hungary a strip of southern Slovakia
and Ruthenia. The deed to the Poles covered about 400 square miles and 240,000
persons; that to Hungary, about 5,000 square miles and 1,000,000 persons.
End of Appeasement
Hitler, of course, was not satisfied with the
Munich settlement. On October 21, only three weeks after signing the accord, he
advised his generals that one of their next tasks would be "liquidation of the
remainder of Czechoslovakia. Another was the seizure of Memel, a port on
the Baltic Sea which had been taken from Germany and placed under League of
Nations auspices in 1919 and had been seized by Lithuania in 1923. While plans
for these undertakings were being prepared, he opened a diplomatic offensive on
still another front, notifying the Polish government on October 24 that he
wished revisions in the statute for the Free City of Danzig, road and rail
corridors through Polish territory to connect Germany with Danzig, and
extraterritorial rights in these corridors for German subjects.
In western European capitals, even while joy
over Munich was at its height, there was some suspicion about Hitler's future
intentions. Daladier was skeptical from the outset that the settlement would
last. Reports from intelligence sources soon aroused similar doubts in members
of the British government. Official and public opinion in both countries veered
toward the view that appeasement had been given its final trial--that the Munich
accords were the last concessions that could be made, and that further demands
by Hitler would call for forthright opposition. In March 1939, this changed mood
was put to the test. Hitler had paid no attention to diplomats' warnings of it.
The French had signed with him on Dec. 6, 1938, a joint declaration guaranteeing
the Franco-German frontier and promising the settlement of future differences by
consultation. The British had made overtures for economic accords. Though meant
as earnests of desire to make the Munich settlement work, these gestures were
interpreted by Hitler as further evidence of spinelessness, and when he next
acted, he did so more brazenly than on any occasion in the past.
Having given encouragement earlier to
Slovakian separatists, on March 11, 1939, he sent Austrian Nazis to Slovakia to
order the Slovakians to proclaim their independence and ask him to become their
protector. In the meantime, the Czech president, Emil Hacha, asked to see the
fuhrer. He was invited to Berlin and given an audience in the early morning
hours of March 15. An almost incredible scene ensued. Hitler told Hacha that
there were only two choices: Czechoslovakia could ask to be occupied peacefully,
or it could be invaded and its people made to suffer. The fuhrer's deputies
literally chased Hacha around a table, trying to force him to sign a
proclamation requesting establishment of a German protectorate. When the aged
Czech fainted, he was revived with injections. Finally he signed. Hitler
immediately ordered his troops to move, and on March 16 he was in Prague,
proclaiming that Czechoslovakia no longer existed. Both the Czech and the
Slovakian regions became German protectorates. In accordance with a prior
understanding the largest part of the Carpatho-Ukraine was turned over to
Hungary.
The reactions in Western capitals were mixed.
The fact that Hacha had invited German intervention made it hard for the French
and the British to do more than protest the violation of the spirit of Munich.
On the other hand, even the firmest believers in appeasement were shocked by
Hitler's seizing new territory after having said so vehemently that he had no
further ambitions and especially by his taking into the Reich 10,000,000 persons
who were not of German nationality. The majority of the French cabinet now
agreed immediately that, when he moved again, Hitler would have to be stopped by
force. At Birmingham on March 17, Chamberlain declared that if the recent German
action proved merely a prelude to other attacks on small states, Britain would
join in resisting "to the utmost of its power.
The nation most likely to be Hitler's
next target was Poland. On January 9, Hitler had renewed his demands with regard
to Danzig, coupling with them a secret communication suggesting that Poland
might in return obtain eventual cessions of territory in the Soviet Ukraine. On
February 1, the Poles refused. On March 21, however, Hitler notified them in
threatening language that the Danzig issue would have to be settled. Two days
later, German troops seized Memel. The French and British had already indicated
that they were prepared to negotiate an alliance with Poland. The chief
stumbling block was the question of whether or not the USSR should be included.
Through the commissar for foreign affairs, Maksim M. Litvinov, the Soviets had
expressed a desire to be a party to the alliance. Polish leaders, however,
looked on this offer with apprehension fully equal to that which had been shown
by the Czechs. While exhibiting eagerness for ties with the British and French,
they still said firmly that they would not permit Soviet troops to cross their
soil. Although most members of the French and British cabinet wanted to form a
common front with Poland and the USSR, they concluded that it would be dangerous
to wait for a change in the Polish stand. On March 23, as a warning to Hitler,
the two governments had declared that they would defend Belgium, the
Netherlands, and Switzerland against any attack. This pledge had been made
without any quid pro quo, and Daladier and Chamberlain decided that their
simplest course was to follow the same procedure with regard to Poland. The
British prime minister asked if the Poles would have any objection. They said
no, and on March 31, Chamberlain announced in the House of Commons: On April 7, Mussolini, imitating Hitler's
tactics, invaded Albania. The British and French governments on April 13
extended their guarantee to Greece and Romania. Abandoning their earlier
policies altogether, they now stood ready to go to war automatically if the
dictators committed new acts of aggression.
Nazi-Soviet Pact
The Western powers were still desirous of
having the USSR on their side. All hope of attaching Italy to their cause had
disappeared. On January 4, Mussolini had told Hitler that he was ready to
negotiate a comprehensive alliance. Although this so-called Pact of Steel,
pledging each nation to join the other immediately in war, was not completed
until May 22, Mussolini meanwhile made no secret of where he stood. Chamberlain
and Daladier had received some encouragement from the United States. Roosevelt
had opened a campaign to repeal the Neutrality acts of 1935-1937 so that
American supplies would be available to Britain and France if war came, but he
was to find it impossible for the time being to carry Congress with him. In any
event, there was no likelihood whatever of early American intervention in their
behalf. If there was to be another power allied with them, it could only be the
USSR.
Despite Polish opposition, the French and
British had continued to discuss a pact with the Soviets. On April 15, the
French suggested that the two Western powers and the USSR sign a treaty
containing pledges of mutual assistance in the event of war. Thus, while the
Soviets would not have any engagement with Poland, they would be obligated to
fight for her if the French and British did so. After a long delay resulting
partly from concern about Poland's role, partly from distrust of the Soviets,
and partly, in all probability, from latent hope for a war between Nazis and
Communists in which the democracies could stand aside. Chamberlain's cabinet
agreed to the French plan. The proposal was made to In the meantime, other negotiations had been
in progress between the Soviets and the Germans. After giving various subtle
indications that Munich had undermined his hope of cooperation with the Western
powers, Stalin on March 10 made a speech summarizing the principles of his
foreign policy as: Although Hitler understood these hints, he was
slow to act on them. Not until late in May did he authorize exploratory
conversations about a trade pact and related matters. After these went on for
some weeks without result, on June 29 he abruptly ordered that they be broken
off. On July 18, he learned of Russian proposals for resumption of the talks.
Eight days later, his foreign minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, spent an evening
sounding out some Russian officials who were in Berlin. Encouraged by the
results of these and other conversations, Hitler decided on a bold gamble. On
August 14, he had Ribbentrop propose to the Russians "a speedy clarification of
German-Russian relations in due course clarifying jointly territorial questions
in Eastern Europe. Now the supplicated rather than the suppliants, the
Soviets raised a number of practical issues. In each instance, Hitler responded
satisfactorily. By August 20, terms had been agreed on, and on August 23,
Molotov and Ribbentrop signed a nonaggression pact in Moscow. The published text
bound both governments to refrain from aggressive action or attack against each
other, to lend no support to a third party should either "become the object of
belligerent action by one, and to join in no "grouping of Powers whatsoever
which is aimed directly or indirectly at the other Party. A secret protocol
stipulated that if "territorial and political transformation should take
place in northeastern Europe, the boundary between German and Soviet spheres
should follow the northern border of Lithuania and the line of the Narew
(Narev), Vistula (Visla), and San rivers in Poland.
Thus was a temporary diplomatic revolution
effected. The Nazi and Soviet dictatorships became allies. Among the great
powers only the British and French remained as potentially active opponents of
German expansion. After the signature of the pact with the USSR, Hitler
reportedly exclaimed, " Now, I have the world in my pocket!
Final Crisis
On April 3, Hitler had directed his generals
to prepare a plan of campaign against Poland, with September 1 as its probable
starting date. On May 23, in a conference with top-ranking officers, he
disclosed that his intention was to use the Danzig question as a pretext and "to
attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity. Meeting Mussolini's
foreign minister at Obersalzberg on August 12-13, Hitler stated that he intended
to move against Poland before the end of the month, and that he was confident
that Britain and France would not intervene. He expressed this conviction to
others. After learning that the pact with the Soviets would become a reality,
however, he convoked his generals at Obersalzberg and, in the course of a long,
rambling speech, told them that while he did not foresee war in the west it was
a risk that had to be run. In any event, he said, delay worked to Germany's
disadvantage. If the British and French did nothing about Poland, he intended to
strike against them soon after the Polish campaign was over. Economically and
militarily, he said, they would profit from further respite while Germany would
not. He ordered that the armies be ready on August 26 to move against Poland
and, if necessary, to hold the western frontier against an Anglo-French attack.
But on August 25, two days after the Nazi-Soviet Pact, the French warned him
once again that they would stand by Poland, and on the same day Chamberlain
announced the signature of a formal Anglo-Polish alliance. Hitler wavered.
Saying that he needed time for negotiation, he ordered the postponement of the
operation.
His chosen pretext had been alleged grievances
of the German population in Danzig. Clamor there for annexation by Germany and
for establishment of road and rail corridors had been augmented since July as a
result of the dispatch to the city of several hundred Nazi agents
provocateurs. Citing the evidence of this agitation, Hitler addressed to
Chamberlain a long appeal for understanding and sympathy. Obviously hoping
against hope that a peaceful solution would emerge, the British prime minister
pressed the Poles to make every concession. They agreed reluctantly to negotiate
about the issues Hitler raised. When their ambassador in Berlin gave notice to
this effect, however, Hitler refused to deal with him unless he had full powers
to reach a settlement on the spot. Exploiting this pretext, he declared to the
British and French governments that it was not he but the Poles who were
rejecting diplomacy. When the government in Warsaw ordered mobilization on
August 30, the German press and radio cried that it was planning an attack. On
the following day, there occurred a small incident on the German side of the
Polish frontier. According to Hitler's subsequent speech, Polish soldiers
attacked a German radio station at Gleiwitz (now Gliwice). Actually the
attackers were Germans outfitted in Polish uniforms, commanded by an SS officer,
and acting on orders from Berlin.
Hitler had already given the final directive
for the invasion to begin at dawn on September 1. It was well under way before
he delivered a radio address throwing all blame on the Poles and saying that he
had had to meet force with force. When the French and British demanded that he
recall his troops, he refused. On September 3, Chamberlain and Daladier gave
formal notice to Germany that a state of war existed. The long armistice of
1918-1939 was over.
Ernest R. May
The number of 17 million is just servicemen There was no
count of Civilian casualties which could well equal that number And of course
there was the 6 million Jews to add to the total
What follows are not my words.. But an article researched and provided by Lola
Associate Professor of
History
Harvard
University